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Race and Democratization 
in South Africa
Bernard Magubane
The issue in this war [Boer War] is whether South Africa is to be a British or
Boer Country.—Winston Churchill.
But if men of the future are ever to break the chains of the present, they will
have to understand the forces that forged them.—Barrington Moore, Jr.
I. IntroductionOn 28 April 1994, about 20 million South Africans, of all shades and
colors and from all walks of life, went to the polls to elect a national
government. It was the first truly democratic election in the history of
South Africa. The result was a stunning victory for the African
National Congress (ANC) and its allies, the South African Communist
Party and Congress of South African Trade Unions. The ANC was
formed in 1912 by the representatives of African people, after the Act
of Union (adopted in 1909 and which was the basis for the new Domin-
ion that came into existence in 1910) had excluded Africans from polit-
ical participation. In 1960, the ANC and Pan African Congress were
banned and operated underground until 1990. In the second democra-
tic elections of 1999, despite predictions that the ANC alliance would
loose support because of unfulfilled promises, it triumphed with an
even larger majority.
The Government of National Unity (GNU) that replaced the
apartheid regime finally brought to an end eighty-six years of white
supremacist rule. April 1994 was also the culmination of the long and
protracted national struggle, which to some seemed an impossibility.
Nevertheless, after trials and tribulations, the will of the people tri-
umphed. The outcome was far from perfect. The challenge to over-
come decades of abuse and want and to heal the wounds left by racist
spoliation still remains. The structural and psychological defects of
white supremacy, from which the “new South Africa” emerged, are
too deep, their inhuman nature too evident, their cupidity for vested
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interests of the old order too powerful to inspire confidence. In the face
of all the flaws, and cognizant of the length of the struggle, are there
enough reserves of energy to refuse temporizing with a system that
represents to victims only misery and degradation?
Why did it take the white rulers of South Africa eighty-six years to
summon the will to negotiate with the indigenous peoples of the coun-
try? Was there, in some objective sense, a mortal conflict between
white qua settlers and African qua indigenous owners of the land,
which made any accommodation impossible? The full meaning of
these questions will emerge more clearly on the basis of specific histor-
ical facts rather than through imposing theoretical assumptions and
then selectively fitting data, the method adopted by those who criticize
the ANC for making too many compromises with the status quo.
This essay essentially seeks first to interrogate how the assumption
to make South Africa a “white man’s country” — à la Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and, indeed, the United States of America—cre-
ated the vicious circle from which the country just emerged in 1994.
Secondly, I want to show how the labor requirements for operating the
largest mining economy in the world, deliberately based on exploiting
vast quantities of cheap indigenous labor, made white supremacist
rule imperative. Most importantly, this essay sets out to demonstrate
that the achievement of democracy is only the beginning of a long
process to regain our lost nationhood and dignity. Given the interna-
tional climate, there remain many rivers and valleys to cross.
II. Where it All Began
In October of 1999, South Africa commemorated the hundredth
anniversary of the South African or Boer War. It was not only one of
the bloodiest conflicts the British had waged since the Crimean War, it
was also the culmination of a series of wars British imperialism had
waged in southern Africa following the “discovery” of diamonds in
1867. A brief chronology of these wars describes the process.
Following hard on the diamond discoveries in 1867 – 71 British colonial
troops made war on the Hlubi in 1873; on the Gcaleka and Pedi in 1877;
on the Ngqika, Thembu, Pondo, Griqua and Rolong in 1878; on the Zulu
in 1879; the Sotho in 1880; the Ndebele in 1883; and the Afrikaner
Republics in 1889. The Cape had absorbed the Transkei and its people in
1879 – 94. Britain had annexed Basutoland in 1868, Griqualand West in
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1871, Zululand in 1887, Matabelaland in 1894, and the Afrikaner
Republics in 1900. The Zulu rebellion of 1906, in which 4,000 Africans
were killed, marked the last stage in 250 years of wars of conquest and
dispossession. South Africa’s incorporation into the sphere of the British
Empire was baptised in blood and subjugation of the African people.1
The opening of the Witwatersrand gold mines (1886) was an event
of even greater significance for South Africa’s relations with Britain
than the diamond discoveries. Gold mining required unlimited sup-
plies of “cheap” African labor. Once in production, the Rand mines
produced almost a quarter of the capitalist world’s supply of gold.
This made the Transvaal and, indeed, South Africa a prized colonial
possession to be brought under the undisputed sphere of British con-
trol, by hook or by crook.
In those days gold played more than a practical, almost a mystic part in
the affairs of nations: that this vast new supply should fall within the
British sphere of authority seemed to the imperialists, not to speak of the
City speculators, almost a divine dispensation. So by the last years of the
century strategy, morality, economics, instinct and plain greed made it
inevitable that the Boer Republics must be tied up beneath the Crown—
‘sooner or later,’ as Winston Churchill wrote, ‘in a righteous cause or a
picked quarrel . . . for the sake of our Empire, for the sake of our honour,
for the sake of the race, we must fight the Boers.2
The questions that hung over South Africa in the first decade of the
20th century were: who was to be enriched by the profits of the Trans-
vaal’s new wealth, and what effect would that have on Britain’s status
in the world? The answer would shape the destiny of South Africa for
the rest of the century.
The nature of white domination and exploitation of the Africans,
Coloureds, and South Africans of Asian extraction remains elusive. For
liberal writers, explanations range from crude notions of social and
cultural pluralism3 to the description of South Africa as a dual society
embodying so-called First and Third World features.4 For neo-Marx-
ists,5 South Africa represents the articulation of modes of production.6
This conceptual and theoretical confusion has resulted in a gross mis-
understanding of the nature of the African struggle and the transition
to majority rule that began in 1994.7 To read these debates today is to
understand the futility and irrelevance, not only of politically disen-
Bernard Magubane
35
gaged scholarship, but of the remarkable fruitlessness of trying to fit
social reality into a preconceived theoretical schema.
Indeed, Marais has already pronounced the negotiated transition of
1994 a failure because the ANC, instead of transforming the state, itself
became assimilated into the status quo. “Already ossifying within the
ANC,” he writes “are trends that ally it to an agenda which conflicts
fundamentally with the hopes and aspirations of the majority of South
Africans.” Even worse, he describes the ANC as having sold out to
neo-liberal policies.
The neo-liberal features of the ANC government’s macro-ventures and
supine postures struck before the demands of corporate South Africa are,
in such a reading, not anomalies. Spurring these developments is the
tendency to judge the possibilities of national development on the basis
of deeply conservative and empirically questionable interpretation of
globalization. Indeed, the post 1994 development seem to amplify Ellen
Meiskin Wood’s lament that: ‘it is not only that we do not know how to
act against capitalism but that we are forgetting how to think against it.’8
Marais goes on to say that “a survey of the ANC history reveals telling
legacies, which though submerged during the anti-apartheid struggle,
have been pushed to the fore during the transition. Indeed, they raise
the question whether a process of change centering on the deracializa-
tion of power and privilege (but without dismantling the structural
foundations of inequality) might not be compatible with the organiza-
tion’s historical discourse.”9
In any historical or sociological endeavor, the most important first
step is to ask the right question. In 1910, when the four white settler
colonies (of the Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal) were
proclaimed, under God, to be an independent White Dominion in the
British Empire, what were the consequences for Africans, Coloureds,
and Africans of Asian extraction to be excluded from the franchise and
ruled as objects rather than subjects?10 Non-whites, to use the expression
of the time, were objects to be governed. And to be governed, accord-
ing to Proudhoun:
is to be kept under surveillance, inspected, spied upon, bossed, law rid-
den, regulated, penned in, indoctrinated, preached at, registered, evalu-
ated, appraised, censured, ordered about, by creatures who have neither
the right, nor the knowledge, nor the virtue to do so. To be GOVERNED
is to be at operation, at each transaction, at each movement, marked
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down, recorded, inventoried, priced, stamped, measured, numbered,
assessed, licensed, authorized, sanctioned, endorsed, reprimanded,
obstructed, reformed, rebuked, chastised. It is, under the pretence of
public benefit and in the name of public interest, to be requisitioned,
drilled, fleeced, exploited, monopolized, extorted, squeezed, hoaxed,
robbed; then at the slightest resistance, the first word of complaint, to be
squelched, corrected, vilified, bullied, hounded, tormented, bludgeoned,
disarmed, strangled, imprisoned, shot down, judged, condemned,
deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed, and to top it off, ridiculed, made a
fool of, outraged, dishonoured. That’s government, that’s its justice,
that’s its morality!11
Human beings are only truly free among equally free humans. Else-
where, I have characterized South Africa not only as a white settler
state but also as a capitalist social formation, which is the product of
British colonialism and imperialism.12 As a dominion, South Africa was
organically developed by usurious British capital to fulfill the colonial
role of mining auxiliary, and as a source of raw materials. More impor-
tantly, South Africa, like other white dominions, has been a major out-
let for Britain’s surplus population. This fact was underlined in 1986 by
Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister. The issue before the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers was the imposition of sanctions on
the apartheid regime. And Britain, as the largest investor in South
Africa, was resisting. Margaret Thatcher, who, according to Anthony
Simpson,13 arrived late and looked exhausted, after listening to an
Asian diplomat discussing a prize for Nelson Mandela, in exasperation
eventually “burst out against the hypocrisy of sanctions and the igno-
rance of other prime ministers: ‘They think we could close down the
South African tourist office just like that...they don’t understand about
bank loans . . . they don’t realise that there are 800,000 South Africans
with British passports.’ ”14
In almost all settler colonies, indigenous populations were dis-
placed or decimated. Only in South Africa did indigenous peoples sur-
vive and, during the post World ll decolonization, their fate became an
international issue. On the other hand, writes Margaret Perham, “The
world hears nothing at the level of international affairs of the Red Indi-
ans, Maoris, or Australian aborigines.”15
One can justifiably ask the question why the African in South Africa
did not suffer the fate of other indigenous peoples in white settler
colonies? This fact was notorious for presenting British imperial states-
men with one of the most intractable problems. By excluding the black
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from citizenship in the Union, white settlers would attempt to desig-
nate the exploited as eternal because white supremacy constituted the
white as an eternity of exploitation.
In so far as the inert sentence passed on the colonized peoples becomes
the serial unity of the colonists (in its ideological form), or their link of
alterity, it is the Idea as Other as Idea; it therefore remains an Idea of
stone, but its strength derives from its ubiquity of absence. In this form
of alterity, it becomes racism.16
Alexander Wilmot, a Cape Town politician and fellow of the Royal
Geographical Society, not only stressed white racial solidarity, but
argued the importance of white exploitation of coloured labor.
The existence of the coloured race is an immense benefit, as by means of
them, cheap labour is obtainable, and large agricultural supplies can be
constantly procured; but Southern Africa, although its population
chiefly comprises the descendants of stalwart nomadic races who have
migrated from a northern part of the continent, is eminently a white man’s
country, where homes can be found for millions of the overflowing populations
of Europe.17 (my italics)
In short, the genocidal wars of the 19th century stopped at the point
where their logic might be detrimental to the labor needs of settlers. As
Cairns puts it:
The Africans, unlike the American Indians or the Australian aborigines,
were expected to play a permanent role in future economic develop-
ment. Consequently, theories justifying their extermination lacked util-
ity, and accordingly were not employed. In essence, the use of
evolutionary theories stopped at the point where their employment
might have been detrimental to European interests.18
Lord Bryce, the British minister who visited South Africa in the first
decade of the 20th century agonized about this problem:
The other set of troubles, those between white settlers and the aborigines
of the land, have been graver in South Africa than any which European
governments have had to face in any other new country. The Red man of
North America, splendidly as they fought, never seriously checked the
advance of the whites. The revolts of the aborigines in Peru and Central
America were easily suppressed. The once warlike Maoris of New
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Zealand have, under the better methods of the last twenty-five years,
become quiet and tolerably contented. Even the French in Algeria had
not so long a strife to maintain with the Moorish and Kabyle tribes as the
Dutch and the English had with the natives of the Cape. The Southcoast
kaffirs far outnumbered the whites, were of courage, had a very rough
and thickly wooded country to defend. . . . The wars, however, did much
to retard the progress of South Africa and to give it a bad name. They
deterred many an English farmer from emigrating there in the years
between 1810 – 1870. They annoyed and puzzled the home government
and made it think of the colony as a worthless possession, whence little
profit or credit was to be shown in return for the unending military
expenditure.19
Is it fair to our white compatriots to remember these things now,
when everybody is rejoicing at the 1994 “miracle”? Would it be fair to
the Africans not to remember that first and foremost their struggle was
to regain their national sovereignty? For the African peoples, what
happened in 1910, especially the loss of the land, is the issue that has
always been closer and more crucial to their lives. For instance, the
first major Acts adopted by the erstwhile Union Government, during
the period 1910 – 1911, were the Mines and Works Act of 1911, which
protected white workers from black competition, and the Native
Labour Regulation Act, which controlled the movement of African
workers. This also established the basis of a “whites only” defense
force. This law complemented the “pass laws” that had been tightened
in 1896 as a means to force Africans into white employment on the
farms and in the mines. All these laws were a precursor to the notori-
ous Native Land Act of 1913, which, in the words of Solomon Plaatje,
made Africans foreigners in their own country.
In his discussion of the impact of the Act, Plaatje describes how a
widow was treated by the landlord for whom her husband had
worked, plowing in shares until his death.20 The landlord told her she
should dispose of her stock and indenture her children to him. “This
sinister proposal makes it evident that farmers not only expected
natives to render them free labour, but they actively wished the natives
to breed slaves for them.” Maria found it difficult to comply with the
enslavement of herself and her children. The Dutchman ordered her to
“clear out” and added, with an oath, “you must get another man
before you reach your next place of abode, as the law will not permit




Such cruelty to dump animals is as unwarranted as it is unprecedented.
It reads cruel enough on paper, but we wish that the reader had accom-
panied us on one journey, say, during the cold snap in the first week in
August, when we travelled from Potchestroom to Vereeniging, and had
seen the flocks of those evicted natives that we met. We frequently met
those roving pariahs, with their hungry cattle, and wondered if the ani-
mals were not more deserving of pity than the owners. It may be the cat-
tle’s misfortune that they have a black owner, but it is certainly not their fault,
for sheep have no choice in the selection of a colour for their owners, and no cows
or goats are ever asked to decide if the black boy who milks them shall be owner,
or but a herd in the employ of a white man; so why should they be starved on
account of the colour of their owners?21
Why these barbaric laws, which are reminiscent of slavery? South
Africa’s most important industries — diamond and gold mining —
were based on extracting surplus value on expendable migrant labor-
ers recruited from the reserves created by the 1913 Act. This Act had its
predecessor in the Enclosure laws of the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries in England. There the enclosures uprooted villages in
the interest of creating a cheap and ready labor supply for the emerg-
ing urban industries. To say that capitalism presupposes the existence
of surplus workers is nowadays common sense. Yet the fact that the
existence of such a class is contingent on a particular set of historical
circumstances has seldom received attention by scholars devoted to
analyzing the development of capitalism in South Africa.
This makes it obvious that the starting point of any analysis and/or
assessment of the prospect for democracy must necessarily review the
legacy of almost one hundred years of white supremacy, if we take
1910 as an analytical base line. Only then can one formulate a “correct”
theory of transition. What was the struggle about? Given the legacy of
white supremacy, what are the prospects for democracy? Never was a
government as committed to democracy as the ANC-led GNU con-
fronted with as many daunting problems!
Predicting the future of democracy in South Africa must be firmly
rooted in the nature of the political economy of the white settler-state
that was created in 1910. This state embodied many contradictions.
One was a secondary contradiction between the white settlers them-
selves — Afrikaners and the English — that led to the Boer War. That
war left the Afrikaners with a bitter hatred of British imperialism, one
that would nourish Afrikaner nationalism. How was this contradiction
resolved? Secondly, one must deal with the major contradiction between
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black and white. Milner, for instance, admitted even as the Anglo-Boer
War was in progress, that though the Anglo-Dutch conflict was bad
enough, compared with the antagonism between white and black, it
was child’s play.22 In the Anglo-Boer rivalries, Africans became pawns.
That fact dominated the racist politics of whites. Africans had no say
about how South Africa’s wealth, which their labor produced, was to
be distributed. And indeed, they still have very little say today, in spite
of the prattle about so-called black empowerment.
In analyzing South Africa’s negotiated national democratic revolu-
tion, one cannot ignore the global conjuncture in which it took place, i.
e., what are the short- and long-term implications of the collapse of the
Soviet Union? What challenges did the negotiated settlement pose for
fulfilling the aspirations of the poor, most of whom are Africans?
Sociological theory recognizes that modern states are not only crea-
tures of definite historical processes, but that they necessarily bear the
imprints or birth marks of their own past.23 South Africa is one country
that can ignore its past at its own peril. The extent and character of the
past deformities does shape the health of the new state. From this
standpoint, it is important to study South Africa’s deformities, shaped,
above all, by white settler racist arrogance and the political economy of
capitalism (the latter based on the extraction of the most useless met-
als). This fact created one of the most unequal and unjust societies in
the capitalist world. In 1978, Thabo Mbeki, now President of the
Republic of South Africa said:
Of the bourgeois countries, South Africa is unique to the extent that
profit maximisation is the overt, unhidden and principal objective of
state policy, and can therefore be regarded with respect to this character-
istic as an almost perfect model of capitalism, cleansed of everything that
is superfluous to its essential characteristics, a model which displays to
all their nakedness, the normative forces of this social system and its fun-
damental interconnectedness.24
The dependence of white settler society on conquered black labor in
South Africa has a long history, which explains why genocidal theories
had to be tempered with the realism of self-interest. In the middle of
the 19th century, the economic imperative led to the importation of
Indian indentured labor to work in the Natal sugarcane fields, and
after the Boer War, it led to the importation of Chinese labor. Exploit-
ing this non-white labor led to the imposition of the Masters and Ser-
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vants Act of 1856, a law, according to the Simonses, far more ruthless
than any in the range of offenses and severity of penalties prescribed
for servants.25 Designed to enforce discipline on ex-slaves, peasants,
pastoralists, and rural proletariat, it survived a century of industrial-
ism, and became a model for similar laws in white settler colonies
throughout south, central, and east Africa. The Act of 1856 remained,
with its offspring, on the South African statute book until 1994, as a
grim reminder of the country’s slave owning past as well as a sharp
instrument of racial discrimination.
The offenses for which the servants could be penalized can be
grouped under three headings: breach of contract, indiscipline, and
injury to property. The first group included the failure to commence
work at an agreed date, unlawful absence from work, desertion, and
strikes. Among the disciplinary offenses were disobedience, drunken-
ness, brawling, and use of abusive language. Servants could be jailed if
they damaged the master’s property with malice and negligence, used
implements unlawfully, lost livestock, or failed to report the loss. Con-
victed servants were not given the option of a fine, however trivial the
offense.26
This system of helotry was imposed by force and maintained
through a legislative program of racist laws unique in history. Thus, in
1910, South Africa had a singular distinction in the capitalist world. It
was a “slave state,” to use Lord Oliver’s phrase.
The white minority state used “race” as part of a “master race”
ethos. According to Hannah Arendt, this ethos had assimilated the feu-
dal notion of inherited rights. “The English brand of race-thinking,”
she says, “was almost obsessed with inheritance theories and their
modern equivalent, eugenics.”27 In South Africa, an aristocracy of race
was projected on a national scale and race thinking established the
position of Englishmen as “a kind of nobility among nations.” The
attempt was made to subordinate the whole of the black population to
a status of pure labor for the benefit of all whites (except those that
Strydom would describe as mad) for advocating equality was a monu-
mental task. It necessitated social engineering on a massive scale. It
was because of this imperative that the South African state passed law
after law to control social change and establish a profound distinction
between “black” and “white.” The Manichaeanism that characterized
the construction and identities of black groups necessitated the exclu-
sion of even children born as a result of the straying sexual lust of
white men for black women.
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In a memo to General Smuts entitled “Notes on a Suggested Policy
towards Coloured People and the Natives,” Lord Selbourne, successor
to Lord Milner as High Commissioner for South Africa and governor
of the Transvaal and Orange Free State from 1905 to 1910, discussed
how to establish a hierarchical structure that would not only ensure
cheap labor but would also fragment the blacks.
Coloured people: Our object should be to teach the Coloured people to
give their loyal support to the white population. It seems to me sheer
folly to classify them with Natives, and treating them as Natives to force
them away from their natural allegiance to whites and into making com-
mon cause with Natives. If they are so forced, in the time of trouble they
will furnish exactly those leaders which the Natives could not furnish for
themselves. It is, therefore, in my opinion, unwise to think of treating
them as Natives; and it would be unjust as unwise. There are many
Coloured people who are quite white inside, though they may be
coloured outside. The problem of the treatment of the Coloured people
is, indeed, sadly complicated by the fact that they vary in every shade of
character and colour from pure white inside and outside to pure black
inside and outside. I suggest the wise policy is to give them the benefit of
their white blood—not to lay the stress on the black blood, but to lay the
stress on white blood, and to make any differentiation of treatment
between them and whites the exception and not the rule. A case for such
differentiation would only arise when a coloured man showed by his
manner of living, e.g., by the practice of polygamy, that he had reverted
to the tribal type.
Natives. The object which the Government must have in their Native pol-
icy are: (i) to preserve the peace of the country, for nothing is so demor-
alizing or so injurious to its true welfare as a native war; (ii) to ensure the
destruction of the tribal civilization among the Natives; (iii) to ensure the
gradual destruction of the tribal system, which is incompatible with civi-
lization. An important feature of this policy will be teaching the Natives
to work. A large proportion of them do work now, but mostly in a desul-
tory and inefficient manner. The object must be to teach them to work
continually and effectively as the whites are supposed to but do not
always do.28
Racism, as a pure system of alien domination, always, within the
limits of safety, seeks to maximize the existential differences between
the ruling and the ruled race; that is, to create a magical and impass-
able gulf between “superior” and “inferior” races. In an address at the
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degree awarding ceremony at the University of Cape Town in 1908,
Lord Selbourne spelled out, once more, the justification for white
supremacy in South Africa.
It is impossible for us, who are once sprung from races which were in
contact with the Roman Civilization before the Christian Era, to look to
the question from the same point of view as the Bantu races who are
totally different. So far as we can form an opinion, our forefathers, 2,000
years ago . . . were distinctly less barbarous than were the Bantu races
when they came into contact with the white men less than 100 years ago.
Nor has the Bantu evinced hitherto any capacity from their first contact
with it.... Speaking generally so far as we can foresee, the Bantu can never
catch up with the Europeans, whether in intellect or in strength of character. As
a race, the white race has received a superior intellect and mental
endowment. The white man is the racial adult, the black man is the racial
child.29 (italics mine)
Segregation and its successor, the policy of apartheid, rested on the
deeply held belief of irredeemable black inferiority. Thus, any blurring
of racial lines was perceived as endangering the structures of white
supremacy and its polarized class structure. Every demand for politi-
cal and social rights translated into a threat to white domination; hence
the banning, first of the Communist Party in 1950, and later the ANC
and PAC in 1960.
The process of capitalist development in South Africa is unique in
that it created the largest, most concentrated, and wealthiest white set-
tler community served by the poorest black working class, most of
whom even today live in compounds, shanty towns, or townships. To
understand the meaning of Oliver’s phrase, let me remind you what it
meant to be white in South Africa from 1910 to 1994, when Mr. Nelson
Holihlahla Mandela, as President of the Africa National Congress, was
elected overwhelmingly to lead the Government of National Unity:
‘If you are white,’ wrote Warramantly, . . . ‘you could not have it better in
this or any other age. Every institution—social, political, industrial, reli-
gious—is tailor-made for your maximum comfort. You will enjoy indus-
trial privileges without industrial responsibility, a disproportionate
share of the wealth of a disproportionately wealthy country, feudal ser-
vice combined with late twentieth century technology, the reservation
for you of the country’s choicest land, privileged medical services. There
will be opulence for your minority in the midst of squalor for the major-
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ity, leisure for your minority in the midst of toil for the majority, power
for your minority in the midst of serfdom for the majority. The slave
wealth of colonial America, the mineral wealth of Ophir and Tarshish,
the territorial wealth of the last days of Empire — all come together to
give you a lifestyle you will not willingly surrender. . . . You live in pleas-
ant surroundings, with affluent whites all around you, you travel in sep-
arate transport, study in separate universities, dine in separate
restaurants, play in separate fields, relax in separate clubs, worship in
separate churches. You pass your life in a gilded cocoon. May be, as you
drift from one gilded cocoon to another, you catch a fleeting glimpse of
the darkness and desolation between—but the vision is too fleeting to be
meaningful.’30
In 1912, the Native National Congress (later Native was replaced
with African) was born. At its birth it was confronted with a situation
in which the structure of white hegemony seemed the natural order of
the world. From 1912 to the end of World War II, it struggled to have
Africans treated as human beings and not as mere, soulless animals
that white capitalists exploited without remorse. This struggle for
“national liberation” took the constitutional route, using the method of
persuasion to advance political and workers’ democratic rights within
the framework of the white settler state as constituted by the Act of
Union. Two years later, the National Party was born, representing
Afrikaner interests. Its main goal was to redress the grievous suffering
of the Afrikaners during the South African War. The ultimate goal of
the National Party was to achieve the republican status that their erst-
while colonies, the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State, had
lost when they were incorporated into the Union of South Africa.
III. Pax Britanica
There is much in South African history that cannot be taken for
granted. In 1890, as the war loomed between the English and the Boers,
Milner explained that the purpose of the war was a final resolution of
the “great game between ourselves and the Transvaal for the mastery
of South Africa.” The object, he said, was the “uniting [of] South Africa
as a British state.” Chamberlain asserted, with characteristic clarity and
hyperbole, that “our supremacy in South Africa and our existence as a
great power in the world are involved.” The deep mining magnates,
the “Park Lane millionaires” of British liberal democracy, had been
suspected of putting up money for the Jameson Raid. The City of Lon-
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don was generally enthusiastic at the prospect of overthrowing the
Kruger regime. In 1899, investments in the gold-mining industry
totaled some £74, 000,000, of which the British share was about 70 per-
cent.31 Because of these interests:
Britain, the ‘mother of democracy,’ brought about a war with two puny,
but independent states, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, for the
sole purpose of laying its bloody stained hands upon the gold mines of
the Rand, whose development since 1886 had transformed the regions
economy.32
In 1907, following the Treaty of Vereeniging granting self-govern-
ment to the Transvaal colony, Pretoria, the provincial capital, wit-
nessed a unique scene that told much about the Anglo-Boer conflict
and the role the Boers were expected to play. The occasion was an offi-
cial dinner for the first Transvaal ministry. General Botha had just
returned from London where he had been received by King Edward
Vll. He had been so moved by the terms under which the Transvaal
was granted self-government, and the demonstration of friendship by
the British government, that on his return to South Africa, he proposed
that the Cullian Diamond, that made all other diamonds look worth-
less (it weighed, uncut, 1.3/4 lbs., and had over 3,000 carats), be given
to the British Crown. It had been picked up in the Premier Mine in
1905. But even its size scarcely measured the magnitude of Botha’s
gratitude. At the official dinner, which began with the singing of “God
Save the King,” Botha declared:
There is no necessity for us to declare our loyalty. That requires no proof.
The world will see that this government is as jealous for the honour of
the flag that waves over us as any ministry ever could be. But, more that,
they are actuated by a feeling of deep gratitude because the King of Eng-
land, the British Government, and the people of Great Britain have
treated the people of the Transvaal in a manner which is not equalled in
the world.. . . The result is that today many men who took part in the war
are British ministers. Is it possible for a Boer to ever forget such a deed of
generosity and justice? Never.33
The Town Hall itself was festooned in Union Jacks. Botha and Smuts,
Britain’s erstwhile enemies, had done for British imperialism more
than the British (from Somerset to Milner) could do for themselves.
They had not only taken their defeated people into the Union, but had
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also made South Africa a member of the White Dominions of the
British Empire. By this act, they had agreed to be junior partners of
British imperialism. South Africa was a Dominion.
It had a King, and God Save the King; a flag, the right flag, of course; a
constitution, a parliament, a framework, all British; even the mace, the
symbol of authority. . . . The generation of British who came to South
Africa at the time had no doubts about it being a British country. No one
who had ever come had doubts, or were ever of the mind to conceive
that the clock would be put back.34
In 1897, Queen Victoria celebrated her Diamond Jubilee. According
to Judd, the use of the description “Diamond” was symbolic: “It was
part of the invention of tradition, and also a reminder that the Empire
contained the diamond fields of South Africa, and as a result, had put
the wearing of such jewelry within the grasp of millions of British
females, including newly-engaged young women from relatively hum-
ble backgrounds.”35
The South African War itself was unique. According to Sir C.P.
Lucas, it stood out as the first in the British Empire in which overseas
Britons—Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders—collaborated
with the mother country. Canada and Australia contributed 31,000
men and South Africa itself contributed 52,000 men. “The effort
strengthened not only the sense of dominion nationhood, but also the
idea of imperial cooperation, which was to develop seriously in the
twentieth century.”36 By the end of the First World War, South Africa
had become a British country in a way it had never been before. For
example, of a group of young men that Milner brought to South Africa
(the so-called Milner’s Kindergarten), a number of them remained in
South Africa and played a major role in its governance.
Patrick Duncan, Milner’s assistant on the Board of Internal Revenue
from 1894 to 1897, came to South Africa as private secretary to Milner.
In 1901 he became the Treasurer of the Transvaal, Colonial Secretary of
the Transvaal in 1903 – 1906, and Acting Lieutenant Governor in 1906.
He remained in South Africa as lieutenant to Jan Smuts, becoming an
advocate of the Supreme Court, a member of the South African Parlia-
ment, Minister of the Interior, Public Health, and Education (1921 –




Richard Feetham was made Deputy Town Clerk and later Town
Clerk of Johannesburg (1902 – 1905). He was legal advisor to Lord Sel-
bourne (who had succeeded Milner as High Commissioner) in 1907
and a member of the Legislative Council of the Transvaal later (1907 –
1910). He was the chairman of the Committee on Decentralization of
Powers in India in 1918 – 1919; a King’s Council in Transvaal (1919 –
1923); Chairman of the Irish Boundary Commission (1924 – 1925);
Chairman of the Local Government Commission in Kenya Colony (of
which Edward Grigg was Governor) in 1926; advisor to the Shanghai
Municipal Council (1930 – 1931); chairman of the Transvaal Asiatic
Land Tenure Commission (1930–1935); Vice Chancellor of the Univer-
sity of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg (1938); and a judge of the
Supreme Court of South Africa in 1939. General Smuts, during the
First World War, had been appointed cabinet minister in Lloyd
George’s War Cabinet.37
That South Africa was ever to become a Boer Republic was contrary
to expectation. In 1931, when God Save the King was replaced by Die
Stem, an irate “Englishman jumped up in the side aisles and pointed
his finger at Hertzog, as all men are apt to do when moved to righteous
anger, and spoke words which were like hostages to fortune: ‘God
Save the King is built into the foundations of this country. As long as
the English language is spoken, so long will it be the national anthem
of South Africa’. . . . For what Hertzog did to the British in this country
was to remove their King from them, and by as it were, the King’s con-
sent, and this was so grievous a deed that no reason, no argument, no
appeal could touch or bring them, even the lawyers among them, to
acknowledge its imperial constitutional legality or its political wis-
dom.”38 Some of the poignancy of these emotions is understandable. In
1961, the final blow fell when the Nationalist Party (NP), that was
formed in 1914 and had been elected by the thinnest margin in 1948,
declared South Africa a Republic. How did it happen?
The “civil war” of 1899 to 1902, between the British and the Boers,
was inevitable. With the discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1886,
British imperial policy could not tolerate an autonomous Boer republic
ruled by a bible thumping religious fanatic like Kruger, “whose regime
rested on support from conservative Boer farmers whose use of native
labor restricted its flow to the mines and whose resistance to change
blocked the creation of a modern political infrastructure.”39
The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion. On May 31,
1902, sixty representatives of the Boer Republics of the Orange Free
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State and the Transvaal, which two years before had been formally
annexed by Britain, accepted the terms of surrender. These included
the recognition of King Edward VII, the surrender of arms, repatria-
tion of prisoners of war, and the use of Dutch in schools where parents
desired it and its use in courts of law. More importantly, the terms
promised the early termination of military administration and the
introduction of representative institutions in preparation for granting
the conquered states self-government. In addition, the question of
granting the franchise to the natives was postponed until the introduc-
tion of self-government. And £3.5 million financial assistance to reset-
tle those displaced by war was promised. British control of the mines
and major industries was now guaranteed.
Liberal historians make much of what they call Britain’s magnani-
mous gesture to the Boers which, they argue, necessitated the betrayal
of the liberal principles of the Cape by the Imperial government. This
“excuse” flies in the face of the well-thought-out intentions of the
leader of the Liberal Party in Britain. Campbell-Bannerman was in no
doubt about the long tradition of the Imperial state which, since the
American War of Independence, had decided on a policy of self-gov-
ernment for white settler communities. Thus, in notes penned during
1901, he asserted that “Mr. Chamberlain thinks we are strong enough
for a military occupation of indefinite length, and perhaps we are; but
it is not the English way to govern white men as a subject race and
England will be involved in a moral catastrophe, worse than all her
losses if we make the attempt.”40
For De Kiewiet, long before the signing of the Vereneeging Treaty in
1902, the post Boer War development had already been set. At the end
of the war, the Boer Republics lay helpless and prostrate at Great
Britain’s feet, but she could only think of one thing: how she might
specially raise the stricken republics and reconcile them to herself.
With such an aim there was no longer any real room for a courageous
native policy.41
To General Smuts, the British, by deferring the African franchise,
seemed to offer his people everything for which they had fought. Ask-
ing his compatriots to accept British terms, he told them:
Hitherto we have not continued the struggle aimlessly. We did not fight
merely to be shot. We commenced the struggle and continued it to this
moment because we wished to maintain our independence, and we were
prepared to sacrifice everything for it. But we may not sacrifice the
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Afrikaner people for it. But we may not sacrifice the Afrikaner people for
that independence. As soon as we are convinced that, humanly speak-
ing, there is no reasonable chance to retain our independence as
republics, it clearly becomes our duty to stop the struggle in order that
we may not perhaps sacrifice our people and our future for a mere idea
of which cannot be realised.42
He pointed out that no help was to be expected from the Cape Colony
or from Europe, whose aid was limited to sympathy. Other nations
would stand and watch “until our entire nation shall have been sacri-
ficed on the altar of history and of humanity.” Smuts’ argument really
was that instead of sacrificing the Afrikaner people for the republic,
the republic was to be sacrificed temporarily to save the people. With
the acceptance of the surrender terms, British hegemony had been
established throughout southern Africa. It now remained for the Eng-
lish and Afrikaners to work through the modalities of coexistence. In
the meantime, the African became the sacrificial ship.
The English and Afrikaner ruling classes never allowed their quar-
rels to disrupt the racial order of white supremacy. They manipulated
the fears of the white electorate for party political gains, but at the end
of the day made common defense of their class interests. Thus, at cru-
cial constitutional stages—in 1902–7, following the Boer War; in 1909–
10, when the terms of unification were being decided; and again in
1936, the year in which the token Cape African franchise was being
removed from the common voters role — both white communities
showed a determination to preserve unadulterated white power. As
political power passed to the Afrikaner nationalists, the British had the
satisfaction that they continued to control the commanding heights of
the economy of the country. In 1948, when the Afrikaners assumed
power, they inherited a state in which white supremacy was not only a
fait accompli but was taken for granted.
In other words, as Arendt observed, when the Boers lost the war,
they temporarily lost their share of the riches, “but definitely they won
the consent of all other European elements, including the British Gov-
ernment, to the lawlessness of race society—today all sections of pop-
ulation, British, or Afrikaner, organized workers or capitalist, agree on
the race question.”43
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IV. The Birth of the Afrikaner Republic
From 1910 to 1948, the Afrikaners played a waiting game while consol-
idating their position in various spheres of South African life. In 1926,
the Hertzog coalition government of nationalists and white labor, tak-
ing a cue from Lord Milner’s policies, imposed the so-called Civilised
Labour Policy. The adoption of this discriminatory policy in the inter-
war years solved the “poor white” problem at the expense of the
African. In the meantime, they watched Britain’s position in the world
decline and become superseded by that of the United States of Amer-
ica.
Already in 1917, Ernest Oppenheimer, in order to raise the neces-
sary capital to launch himself in South Africa, looked to American
financiers. Writing to Mr. Herbert Hoover, then-president of Morgan
Guaranty & Trust Company, Oppenheimer said: “If American capital
wishes to obtain a footing in the South African mining business, the
easiest course will be to acquire an interest in our company.”44 With the
capital obtained from Morgan Guaranty, Oppenheimer formed the
Anglo-American Corporation (AAC).45 The AAC developed into the
backbone of mining life in South Africa and other British dependen-
cies. Thus, it is not surprising that on November 12, 1934, General
Smuts, in a speech before the Royal Institute of International Affairs,
declared:
The Dominions have stronger affections toward the U.S.A. than Great
Britain has. There is a community of outlook, of interests and perhaps
ultimate destiny between the Dominions and U.S.A.46
South Africa’s pro-United States position goes back to the formation of
the League of Nations. There, President Wilson accorded Smuts a high
profile in the deliberations. For instance, a Japanese delegation pro-
posed the inclusion of a clause recognizing “the principle of equality of
nations and just treatment of their nationals,” and which would guar-
antee “no distinction on account of race and nationality.” This modest
proposal, though supported by a majority of the nations, was defeated
by the British and American opposition. Lord Cecil objected because
such a suggestion “raised extremely serious problems for the British
Empire,” while President Wilson protested that it “would raise the
race issue through out the world.”47
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Following the opening of the Witwatersrand gold mines, South
Africa faced what was called the Poor White problem. In the late twen-
ties, the Carnegie Corporation funded the first major research project
on the issue of poor whites in South Africa. In their visits to South
Africa, associates of the Carnegie Corporation had expressed fears that
poor whites represented a threat to the existing racial order since their
poverty undermined the assumption of white supremacy. In a memo-
randum, Frederick Keppel, the President of Carnegie Corporation,
reported that there was “little doubt that if the natives were given full
economic opportunity, the more competent among them would soon
outstrip the less competent whites.” The poor white problem, he said
was of the “utmost gravity, which neither sociology, nor economics,
nor public health, nor psychology and education can deal with
alone.”48 It was because of these fears that Keppel suggested that to
avoid “complication, an invitation to the Corporation from some non-
political body to support the study is essential.”49
The Carnegie Commission’s The Poor White Problem in South Africa
was a milestone in terms of United States-South Africa relations. The
report concluded that segregation was a “wise policy” since the “con-
sequence of social intercourse with non-Europeans” led to the “lower-
ing of the European standard of living to one approximating to the
standard of the native.” The report was relieved to find that the “great
majority of poor whites are still imbued with the conviction of their
superiority over non-Europeans” and the “feeling has played an
important part in preventing miscegenation.” Be that as it may, the
report expressed grave fear that this state of affairs could not endure
for long and that some form of racial deterioration would be the out-
come. The unspoken objective of the report was the maintenance of
white supremacy in South Africa.
The preoccupation of the Carnegie Corporation with the so-called poor
white problem in South Africa was at least partly the outcome of similar
misgivings about the state of the poor whites in the American South. In
both situations, the integrity of the white race appeared to be put at risk
by the fitness of the lower classes.50
In other words, the entrenchment of white supremacy in South Africa
was not just a local issue of white settlers; Britain and the United States
played a major role.
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The opposition of the National Party to South Africa’s participation
in World War II is well known. To make a long story short, the post-
1948 era will be noted first for the fact that the squalid racial politics
between the English and Afrikaners were always settled by the intro-
duction of even more draconian racial laws from which both fractions
of the bourgeoisie stood to gain at the expense of blacks. Competitive
merchants, shopkeepers, and real estate agents united in pressing for
measures like the Group Areas Act, which limited business opportuni-
ties for Asians, Africans, and Coloureds in the main shopping centers
and gave whites exclusive ownership of land in select suburbs. Com-
petition for cheap black workers, to take another example, was always
a chronic cause for dissension between, on the one hand, farmers and
mine owners and, on the other, the urban based manufacturing indus-
tries. The former always clamored for and obtained stringent pass laws
to direct the flow of African labor away from urban areas.51 This more
than anything is what apartheid was fundamentally about—it refined
the racial instruments of exploitation and oppression that had their
roots in the Masters and Servants Act of 1856.
The irony of the Anglo-Boer War is that it led Verwoerd to with-
draw South Africa from the now multi-national Commonwealth, and
declare it a republic. Thus, a country heavily franked with British sym-
bols now would bear an Afrikaner stamp. In pre-Republic days, the
South African Parliament had life-sized pictures of the British mon-
archs that looked down from each side of the speaker’s chair, but in
1961 they were unceremoniously removed and now adorn the South
Africa Museum, together with the Mace, as relics of a dead past.
Allighan says that:
Some ardent Republicans, when those symbols of royalty had been
removed, had suggested that the Mace, lying on an orange velvet cush-
ion in the Museum, should bear an inscription consisting of the historic
words of Britain’s great Republican, Cromwell — ‘Remove that bauble’
—but others recalled, something equally historic: that, subsequently, the
‘bauble’ returned; also the Monarchy.52
With the transformation of South Africa into a republic, Afrikaner-
dom was now politically supreme. It consolidated its power and white
supremacy to the satisfaction of everyone. It had an all-Afrikaner gov-
ernment. In light of step-by-step afrikanization of all government insti-
tutions, it was not a surprise. What needs special comment is that, in
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the process of allowing the Afrikaners to declare a republic, the Eng-
lish had exchanged the symbols that contained their history — the
Crown, Commonwealth, and God Save the Queen — for the economic
comforts of an Afrikaner-ruled republic that was based on white
supremacy. In 1957, Parliament unanimously adopted the Afrikaner
national anthem, “Die Stem,” with its English translation, as the only
national anthem. By Act No. 18 of the same year, the Union Jack was
unanimously abolished as an official flag. The significance of these
developments is summed up as follows by Krüger:
There was little protest from English South Africans. It was a clear sign
that the time for divided loyalties was past and held a promise as to the
common future of the white race in this part of Africa.53
In the Assembly debate of September 18, 1958, Verwoerd set out his
policy on the native question and on the republican question:
Once we can get away from the present struggle over the colour problem
and the issue of freedom, by securing the safety of the White man and
assuring South Africa’s status as a republic, new party orientations will
arise of their own accord. Indeed, in such a Republic where our colour
policy will be generally accepted there will be no place for a liberal party
which strives to establish joint rule by white and non-white.54
In regard to the principles of apartheid, he declared his party’s adher-
ence to the cynical policy of Rhodes, which had created the reserves as
the bases for exploiting African labor. For these areas, he foresaw a
time when they would resemble the British Commonwealth. For
whites, he said, the other choice was a unitary policy in which South
Africa would be dominated by blacks, and where whites would be a
minority.
Dr. Verwoerd also expressed his firm belief that the change in South
Africa’s status to a republic would not lessen its importance as an out-
post of Western civilization on the southern tip of Africa. “Not one of
us will want to make South Africa a small republic isolated from the
society of nations.” The relationship with Britain, he assured the Eng-
lish, would be improved “if all of us in this country feel that we are one
people, with undivided loyalty to one country and one nation, with
our two languages accepted beyond dispute as two languages of this
country.” There would then be no ulterior motives in seeking the
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friendship of Britain. The sooner the republic was established, the
sooner there would be an end to the discord between the English- and
Afrikaans-speaking people. He assured the House that “White civiliza-
tion can be saved and White civilization can continue to exist here on
the southern tip of Africa in the service of the world.”55
Verwoerd rejected the concerns of the Leader of the Opposition,
who had expressed anxiety about the future and had offered as a solu-
tion the increase of the white population by means of immigration. “In
the first place he knows and all know that we will never be able to
import so many Whites that in a mixed fatherland they will be able to
outnumber the Natives. He will not find so many immigrants; he will
not be able to establish them in this country; he will not be able to pro-
vide them with a living in this country so that even in the next 50/60
years our numbers will be equal.”56
If we compare the treatment of the Boers with the treatment of the
African chiefdoms and kingdoms, we begin to appreciate why South
Africa from 1910 to 1994 was called a “white man’s country,” and why
the African was constituted as the inferior and dispensable other.
V. Empire is Race: The Culture of Imperialism
In the long history of British colonial imperialism, there is, for sheer
explosive expansion, no period comparable to the thirty years from
1870 to 1900. This period saw “Jingoism” at its most egregious. It
resulted in bloodshed and injustice around the globe and made
Britain’s name synonymous with racial hatred. The Empire was mobi-
lizing for war, and music hall audiences, infected with war fever, bel-
lowed out the song of the moment:
We don’t want to fight, but, by Jingo if we do,
We’ve got the ships; we’ve got the men;
We have got the money too!57
A list of some major developments in that extraordinary era is war-
ranted:
There was a clamour for war against Russia in defence of Turkey, the
most backward and barbarous of the great powers; the occupation of
Egypt; a confrontation with France over spheres of influence on the
Upper Nile, with Germany over South West Africa, with Russia over
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Pandjeh; a war of conquest and revenge in the Sudan; the acquisition of
Cyprus; the annexation of the Transvaal, Buluchistan, Socotra and
Upper Burma; the foundation of protectorates over Bechuanaland,
Northern and Southern Nigeria, Uganda and part of Somaliland; the vir-
tual destruction of the Zulus and the Matabele; the foundation of the
Rhodesias; an invasion of Afghanistan; the Jameson Raid; two Boers
Wars. This added up to nearly five million square miles of territory and
nearly a hundred million souls to the empire, and surely if ever a people
showed its aggressive colours without shame, then the British people
showed them during that quarter of a century that wound up the Victo-
rian age.58
In political, economic, and cultural terms, British imperialism
emerged from the Boer War with an intensified and long-established
sense of Anglo-Saxon racial supremacy. On a scale of narcissistic self-
flattery, by the end of the 19th century, Anglo-Saxon “innate racial
supremacy” was being expressed to a degree unknown in any other
era. For Seeley, the British Empire was an expression of the special
genius of the Anglo-Saxon race. In the years from 1870 to 1900, “the
‘dominant passion of England’ was to extend its empire; and the
healthy continuance and immutability of Anglo-Saxon supremacy was
being expressed in ‘scientific’ terms of social Darwinism.”59
The consequence of Social Darwinism was that almost any expres-
sion of opinion, however arbitrary or platitudinous, about rivalry and
struggle was sanctified with “science.” Scientific racism was unequivo-
cal in its commitment to a scientific and, indeed, biological conception
of politics. It transferred Darwin’s principles readily from plants and
animals to human society, suggesting that white races were better fit-
ted to survive and flourish than others. Social Darwinism elevated
amorality to a first principle. It now became a question of whether any
action contributed to the survival and welfare of the imperial nation.
Indeed, racism was the purest non sequitur, associating physical fitness
and wholeness of moral, intellectual, and cultural capacity. In its con-
struction of the other, and the criteria of group formation, it was more
color conscious than nationalist. Racism asserted a color determination
for social and political participation.60
The doctrine of white supremacy gained in plausibility when it was
presented in the context of the wars of conquest. The most significant
players in the drama of South Africa during and after the Boer War
were all social imperialists—Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary; Lord
Milner; and John Buchan, Milner’s Private Secretary. Their notions of
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racial superiority were blended with arguments for imperial unity and
became the ideology of the new imperialism. As Robinson and Gal-
lagher put it:
By the seventies, confederated Canada, responsibly governed Australia,
and the Cape were regarded as constitutional embodiments of collabora-
tion between British and colonial interests working at its best. The fur-
ther slackening of formal bonds by colonial governments, it is true,
raised qualms about the future of imperial unity. Yet the policy makers
felt sure that their self-governing colonials, bound by silken cords of kin-
dred, tradition and self-interest, would continue to be their most loyal
and energetic partners in spreading British influence and multiplying
British commerce. Unlike the financial and trading enterprises which
were thrusting into Oriental empires, those of the white colonists were
proving commercially and politically creative. They had the supreme
virtue of being self-propelling. The impetus to expansion was soon com-
ing, not so much from the Metropolis as from the colonial communities
themselves.61
Thus, in South Africa, the ideological liaison between imperialism and
racism became much closer. As British imperialism emerged from the
brutal wars of conquest, theories of imperialism and white supremacy
shared a quest for organic and essentially subjective group identifica-
tion. From Social Darwinism they derived many crude insights to
rationalize and reformulate old prejudices. That is, scientific racism,
with its unequivocal commitment to a “scientific” and biological con-
ception of politics, would be more deeply rooted in South Africa.
From 1900 to the formation of the Union in 1910, there was a cas-
cade of boy’s tales set in South Africa, including Henty’s With Buller in
Natal. The politics of these books was crude; Henty represented Britain
as the “great civilised power on earth’” fighting against the Boers who
were “without even the elements of civilisation, ignorant and brutal
beyond any existing white community.”
Imperial propaganda of the gripping kind produced by Henty and his
fellow wordsmiths was deliberately spread to all classes. Henty’s pub-
lishers encouraged state and Sunday-school teachers to present his
books as prizes, and thousands were duly presented. Working-class chil-
dren could share in the adventure of their social superiors, learn about
the deeds which shaped the empire, absorb some of the imperial ideas.
The new imperial ideology was already penetrating the elementary-
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school classrooms through the curriculum. Nearly all the geography
learned by trainee teachers at Cavendish College, Cambridge in 1896
consisted of lists of colonies, details of how they were obtained, their
products and accounts of their native inhabitants, all of which were
passed on for their pupils to memorise. In the same year the recom-
mended outlines of a lesson on South Africa drew attention to the primi-
tive Calvinism of the Boers and their reluctance to wash frequently. As
for blacks, they ‘have become reconciled to the inevitable supremacy of whites’
and had been taught to be ‘useful servants.’62 (italics mine)
To give another example, A.E. Haddon, who helped found anthro-
pology as an academic discipline at Cambridge and London, described
the Empire in terms of Darwinian principles. He wrote that, “the state-
ment that the most efficient peoples ultimately prevail may be
accepted as correct. The racial, economic, social, and political history of
South Africa affords a striking example of this process in the natural
relations of Bushman, Hottentot, Bantu, Boer and Briton.”63
These lessons fortified the tendency to judge morality only in terms
of its contribution to the supremacy of the white settlers. In the above
passage, we see racism being produced as a cultural project to socialize
all classes in Britain for their role as an imperial nation. There is an
attempt to equip every Briton with the moral, intellectual, and cultural
capacity to be superior not only to the natives; but to the Boers them-
selves,64 even though they would soon be wooed to be the junior part-
ners in ruling “the lower breeds without the law.”
In considering relations between groups, nationalists might dispense
with the deduction of inequality from difference; but for racists this
illogical procedure was fundamental. The [nationalists] were, sur-
rounded by foreigners, the latter by, half-men. When structuring deal-
ings with what was alien, the nationalist might choose between hatred
and indifference. The racist, confronting the innately inferior as potential
agents of biological degeneration, had much less choice. He tended to
manifest both hatred and contempt and indifference only in the sense of
carelessness about whether those who thus endangered his race were
treated like men at all. Nationalism might serve, according to circum-
stances, the purpose either of freedom or of bondage. But racism ide-
alised always an epitomization of illiberal society. It was necessarily, and
not merely contingently, aggressive and anti-individualistic. It was the
most rigid expression of belief in an almost divine finality—predestina-
tion by blood.65
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I have quoted Biddiss at such length because what he says throws
important light on the role of racism in South Africa. At its apogee in
the Act of Union, by defining only whites as constituting the nation
and everybody else as an outsider, it transcended the concept of terri-
tory as constituting a nation.
In South Africa, the acquisition of the Cape Colony by the British
led to the abolition of slavery in 1833. The disenchanted Boers
migrated into the interior of the country. By 1846, the British had
fought their seventh so-called Kaffir war of dispossession. The dispos-
sessed Africans were increasingly seen and treated not only as an infe-
rior species but also as dispensable labor. The exploitation of
diamonds in Kimberley from 1867, followed by gold in 1886, meant
that the desire to exploit Africans as cheap disposable labor became
institutionalized in the migrant labor system.
De Kiewiet, in his inimitable style, equated black labor with “a great
raw material.” As he put it:
What an abundance of rain and grass was to New Zealand mutton, what
a plenty cheap grazing was to Australian wool, what the fertile prairie
were to Canadian wheat, cheap native labour was to South Africa.66
Equating Africans with factors of production had a profound impact
on how they would be treated. That is, racism was not simply a ratio-
nale to justify conquest and domination. It was far more. It was a
means to unite the conquerors and demoralize the victims; to enslave
by inducing the slave mentality that ensures “acceptance” of one’s sta-
tion in life as an act of nature. This was the basis for residential and ter-
ritorial segregation. The vast scale of cheap labor could only be
exploited efficiently if a unified “white” settler and foreign class or
complex of classes had a sense of superiority and difference.
Urged by the greedy owners of financial capital and the emerging
settler agrarian capitalists, the British colonial apparatus launched an
aggressive policy to increase political and administrative control over
what they called native labor in the whole of southern Africa, up to the
21st parallel. The key document for the creation of native labor is the
South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) that was
appointed by Lord Milner in 1903, and made its report in 1905. Briefly,
SANAC’s charge was to provide an estimate of the number of natives
from all over southern Africa who would be available, if the legal
mechanism to compel them to work could be put in place. Of the age
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group between 15 and 50, SANAC calculated that in British Africa
(which included the Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, with Swazi-
land and the Orange River Colony, and southern Rhodesia, Basu-
toland and Bechuanaland Protectorate), there were about 900,000
able-bodied possible workers, of whom from 450,000 to 475,000 might
be held to be always at work, or available for work The units of this
total were said to oscillate between their homes and outside labor, but
the approximate total was constant.
The estimated constant demand of native labor by white capital at
any one time was estimated at 782,000. The supply was estimated at
474,472, showing a shortfall of 307, 528 laborers. The Commissioners
then posed this critical question:
Under these circumstances the question naturally arises, how in South
Africa agriculture or any industry is carried on? The answer is that when
carried at all it is carried on under difficulties, as to which there is abun-
dant evidence. The British South African aboriginal Native population has not
fully met the labour requirements of the country. There is no doubt that were
these Natives alone to be relied upon, South African industries could at
present only be worked at half power.67
In this paragraph lies the essence of institutional racism. That is, the
process of capitalist expansion in South Africa is inextricably linked to
the reduction of Africans to nothing but pure labor power. Unfortu-
nately, it is not always appreciated in theorizing about race and class
in South Africa that the key to understanding why racism became so
deeply entrenched in every aspect of south Africa’s life lies in the over-
whelming importance of gold mining. Indeed, South Africa’s specific
integration into the international capitalist economy in the second
quarter of the nineteenth century was through its gold production. As
Johnson put it:
Gold is the overwhelmingly visible, nay tangible, fact of South Africa
life. Her greatest city Johannesburg is, in every sense, built on it. Her
largest company, Anglo-American, owes its position to its ownership of
two-fifths of the mines; the mining operations are vast and employ some
700,000 people. Of the economically active workforce in 1960 one in
every seven men and one in every twelve women (of all races) worked in
mining. It is above all, the dominant fact of life for urban African men. In
1960, of all such men who had jobs, more than one in every three worked
in the mining sector.68
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South Africa was able to develop such a large-scale gold mining
industry — of very low grade ore, buried deeply in the earth’s crust,
under thick layers of hard rock, to be removed and profitable exploited
—because of the availability of cheap and disposable black labor. How
did this work in actual practice? Quite early in the exploitation of dia-
monds, Cecil Rhodes and De Beers introduced a classic system of labor
control and “theft” prevention.
They hit on the idea of confining African miners in closed compounds
for four or six months of their contract period. . . . The compound was an
enclosure surrounded by a high corrugated iron fence and covered by
wire-netting. The men lived, twelve to a room, in huts or iron cabins
built against the fence. They went to work along a tunnel, bought food
and clothing from the company’s stores, and received medical treatment
but no wages during sickness, all within the compounds. Men due for
discharge were confined in detention rooms for several days, during
which they wore only blankets and fingerless leather gloves padlocked
to their wrists, swallowed purgatives, and were examined for stones
concealed in cuts, wounds, swellings and crevices.69
To Keynes, gold was a “barbaric relic” and, indeed, it is. Yet it formed
the backbone of South Africa’s economy. Is it any wonder that on its
basis was created one of the most barbaric racist states?
Moore, Jr. argues that certain forms of capitalist transformation are,
for fairly obvious reasons, unfavorable to the growth of free institu-
tions. For instance, a landed upper class person may maintain intact
the preexisting peasant society, introducing just enough changes in
rural society to ensure that peasants generate a sufficient surplus that
can be appropriated and marketed at a profit. Or a landed upper class
person may devise wholly new social arrangements along the lines of
plantation slavery. “Straightforward slavery in modern times is . . . a
creation of a class of colonizing intruders into tropical areas.”70 Both
the system of maintaining peasant society intact but squeezing more
out of it and the use of servile or semi service labor on large units of
cultivation require strong political methods to extract the surplus, keep
the labor force in its place, and in general make the system work.
Moore says that not all these methods are political in the narrow
sense. Particularly where the peasant society is preserved, there are all
sorts of attempts to use traditional relationships and attitudes as a
basis of the landlord’s position. Economists distinguish between labor-
intensive and capital-intensive types of agriculture. Moore says it may
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be helpful to speak of labor-repressive systems, of which slavery is but
an extreme type. With minor modifications, Moore’s insights can be
applied to the South African mining industry.
The theory which relegated manual labor to the native, and by
which the dividing line was drawn between skilled white and
unskilled native labor was spelled out by Lord Milner to a Deputation
of the White Labour League. He said:
Our welfare depends upon increasing the quantity of our white popula-
tion, but not at the expense of its quality. We do not want a white prole-
tariat in this country. The position of the whites among the vastly more
numerous black population requires that even the lowest ranks should
be able to maintain a standard of living far above that of the poorest sec-
tion of the population of a purely white country. But, without making
them hewers of wood and drawers of water, there are scores and scores
of employment in which white men could be honourably and profitably
employed, if we could at once succeed in multiplying our industries and
in reducing the cost of living. . . . However you look at the matter, you
always come back to the same root principle—the urgency of that devel-
opment which alone can make this a white man’s country in the only
sense in which South Africa can become one, and that is, not a country
full of poor whites, but one in which a largely increased white popula-
tion can live in decency and comfort. That development requires capital,
we have got capital, but it also requires a large amount of rough labour.
And that labour cannot, to any great extent, be white, if only because,
pending development and in subsequent reduction in cost of living,
white labour is much too dear.71
Here, indeed, are the roots of Hertzog’s Civilised Labour Policy, and
apartheid’s policy of Job Reservation. In the 1960s, when Nationalist
leaders were confronted with hostility for the policy of apartheid, they
always reminded their critics, especially in the West that:
Parallel existence of the White and non-White peoples in this country
has been a traditional policy, the monopoly of no one political Party.
Hertzog and Smuts, no less than Malan and Verwoerd, advocated and
implemented it, as did the British before all of them. There has never
been a Party, nor a Prime Minister, elected to this House on the multi-
racial policy because it is, in logical effect, a policy of non-White domina-
tion. For any political Party to have employed that policy as its election
platform would have meant its complete and utter destruction at the
hands of practically all electors. In different forms which were mainly
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concerned with methods of implementation, the two major Parties in
South Africa have, ever since Union, stood firmly by the traditional par-
allel system of partial separation — social and residential — and indus-
trial integration. Both were agreed that the Bantu should have no voting
powers which enabled them to be directly represented in this House.72
VI. Prelude to 1994
Anniversaries in the history of peoples and nations are important mile-
stones. It is when they take stock of where they have come from and
chart where they are going. If the Anglo-Boer War was the turning
point in the history of South Africa and of Anglo-Boer relations, and if
it was the result of that war that British imperialists, as a policy of so-
called reconciliation, decided to make concessions to the Boers which
would ultimately “hand” them the country in 1948, then 1994 must be
regarded as an even more significant watershed in the history, not only
of South Africa, but of the world. In 1994, South Africa opened a new
chapter in its history. An understanding of what happened in the past
will inform the strategies for the present and guide future actions.
Is it not remarkable that there would be no grand and official
national celebration of the hundredth anniversary of the Boer War,
similar in scale to the celebration in 1952 of van Riebeick’s tercentenary
or to the past celebrations of Dingane’s defeat at the hands of the
Boers? On the contrary, the release of Nelson Mandela in February
1990 began a worldwide celebration that ushered in a new era in the
history of South Africa. How ironic that after one hundred years, the
white rulers of South Africa find themselves with nothing to celebrate
on the anniversary of the Anglo-Boer War!
The Sharpeville Massacre of March 1960 and the struggles that
marked its aftermath proved that the more dependent the white ruling
class became on black sweat and skills for its prosperity, the more jeal-
ous it became of its monopoly over economic and political privileges,
and the more finely it sharpened those instruments which ensured its
hegemony.73
From 1960 onwards, white minority rule not only had to contend
with internal revolt, for the first time it had to face worldwide condem-
nation, spearheaded by the newly independent African states and their
compatriots in the non-aligned movement. The massacre of the
defenseless protesters finally convinced the ANC and its allies that the
days of resistance confined to non-violent and solely legal methods
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was over. In March 1961, Verwoerd called a referendum so that white
voters could make their wishes known about whether South Africa
should be a republic or remain a monarchy. The ANC saw this as fur-
ther entrenchment of Afrikaner arbitrary rule. Therefore, it called for a
national convention in which representatives of all the people of South
Africa could make their wishes known. If the regime failed to heed its
call, the ANC called for a general strike to coincide with the declara-
tion of the Republic scheduled for May 31, 1961.
In response, the apartheid regime declared a state of emergency,
and put the country on a war footing. On December 16, 1961,
Umkhonto We Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation) announced its fateful
appearance with a series of bombings of government installations,
while declaring:
The people’s patience is not endless. The time comes in the life of any
nation when there remain only two choices — submit or fight. That time
has now come for South Africa.
This development, even though dismissed at the time as a mindless
pinprick, proved once again that the past is never past, but active in
the present.
There is a tendency, when discussing the South African transition,
to ignore the general anti-colonial struggles of which it was a part. In
the whole of southern Africa, the atmosphere of the early 19th century,
the so-called Kaffir wars, was back again. The push, instead of being
from south to north, was now from north to south. There were armed
struggles in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zim-
babwe. In each one of these countries, an event or a sequence of events
signaled the need for armed struggle.
In the Guinea-Bissau the signal event was the bloody repression, in
which fifty workers were killed and many injured. In Mozambique it
was the 1960 Muenda massacre of 600 at a peaceful meeting. In Angola it
was the killing of thirty and wounding of 200 at a meeting in Calete to
protest the arrest of MPLA leader Agostino Neto, combined with the
brutal repression of the Maria uprising led by a militant Christian sect.
In Zimbabwe a series of preparations for armed struggle were prompted
by the settlers successful Unilateral Declaration of Independence, which
shattered any remaining illusion that Britain might act against the inter-
est of its kith and kin to enforce majority rule. In Namibia, the turn to
armed resistance occurred immediately after the abortive 1966 judge-
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ment of the International Court of Justice, when the process of interna-
tional and legal pressure had been tested to its limits and found want-
ing.74
Southern Africa in the 1960s was not only the stronghold of the old
European empire. It was also the most promising area of the new
American empire. Here was produced one-fifth of the world’s copper
and tin, nearly one-fourth of its manganese, more than half its gold,
80% of its cobalt, and 98% of its industrial diamonds. More than half of
the world’s known supply of uranium lay in the Congo, Namibia, and
South Africa. These economic realities made the region a Cold War
arena. Much was at stake for the United States, Britain, and their impe-
rialist allies with the outcome of the decolonization process. The
Chicago Tribune commented at the time:
The public investment of the United States money in Africa runs into
more than a half-billion dollars, and private investment may even be as
much or more. Imperialism would be a nasty word to describe our
expanding interests in Africa but the list of American projects to develop
the vast military resources of this continent suggest that the nineteenth
century imperialism of England, France, Belgium, and Portugal is a
child’s play. . . . However we may feel ideologically, we are politically
and financially increasingly committed to the Empire—either our allies’
or our own in competition with theirs. How much of our billions in for-
eign aid to France, Britain, and Belgium has gone to strengthen the
machinery of colonialism? . . . Whether we give or invest, we invite
responsibility. And in view of some of our allies at least, we are at last
learning to discharge that responsibility in a proper fashion.75
The editorial also noted the behavior of U.S. representatives on the
Trusteeship Council, which it said showed the United States’ support
of South Africa.
Thus at a time when the protection of the Western World’s vested inter-
ests in Africa south of the Sahara has become seemingly a matter of life
or death that winds of revolution are sweeping across the continent. If
the white man has ever before been so keenly aware of the value of
Africa’s resources, the black man has never before been so keenly aware
of the values of freedom. . . . The United States is in Africa to stay, just as
it is in Europe.76
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One of the most nonsensical arguments from the apologists of imperi-
alism is that Africa today is being marginalized because it has no eco-
nomic importance to the world economy!
In the period after 1963, when Mr. Mandela and his compatriots
were sentenced to life imprisonment, white supremacy, with the help
of the United States and its allies, appeared triumphant. But even with
the odds against them, the spirit of resistance of the peoples of south-
ern Africa was not broken; far from it. In 1975, the people of Mozam-
bique and Angola became independent. In 1976, the situation in South
Africa changed dramatically. The Soweto student revolt opened the
log jam. From 1976 onward, black resistance took a dramatic and men-
acing turn. To extricate itself from the crisis, the South African regime
formulated what it called “total strategy” and embarked on a dual
strategy: unparalleled repression on the one hand and, on the other,
“reform” of apartheid, which included “granting” independence to the
reserves (now called bantustans) of the Transkei, Ciskei, Bopu-
tatswana, and Venda. The regime also “reformed” the laws governing
African labor, and gave the coloureds and Indians constitutional dis-
pensation. The tricameral constitution of 1983 gave the illusion of shar-
ing power while maintaining firm white control. These moves were
seen by certain sectors of the Afrikaner establishment as a thin end of
the wedge, which would ultimately undermine white minority rule
and lead to an irreparable split in the National Party.
The independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975 and Zim-
babwe in 1980 changed the geopolitics of southern Africa. The writing
was now on the wall for the white minority regime in South Africa that
its days were numbered. The intensification of the popular struggles in
South Africa and the defeat of South Africa’s expeditionary forces in
Angola did immeasurable harm to the prestige of the white regime’s
armed forces. The shock was even worse because it was with the help
of socialist Cuba that the victory of the MPLA movement in Angola
was achieved. The split in Afrikanerdom between the so-called
enlightened (Verlgte) faction and the hide bound (Verkrampte) faction
caused the white bourgeoisie to take a deep look at what it stood to
lose if the extreme elements in the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie tri-
umphed. It was similar, in a way, to the deep look by Smuts following
the defeat of the Boer forces in 1902.
The dramatic developments received a big boost with the formation
of the United Democratic Front in 1983 and the Congress of South
Africa Trade Unions in 1985. Everywhere in South Africa, the struggles
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for liberation were gathering a new momentum: students, workers,
and peasants were striking out against the apartheid regime in all
directions. These developments accelerated the disorganization of the
apartheid regime. In the summer of 1985, The London Economist, in a
special issue on South Africa, described the situation that faced P.W.
Botha as tantamount to what it called degenerative collapse.
Not surprisingly, those sectors with a lot to lose from the escalating
conflict began to make tentative approaches to the ANC. In 1985, the
major representatives of South Africa’s monopoly capitalism made a
pilgrimage to Lusaka to open talks with the ANC. These included rep-
resentatives from the Premier Group, Barclays Bank, Sanlam and Bar-
low Rand. The leader of this delegation was Gavin Relly, chairperson
of Anglo-American Corporation.
The impending defeat of the apartheid regime in the 1980s saw the
fears expressed by The Nation editorial becoming a reality. To the Rea-
gan and Thatcher administrations, the possibility of victory by the
ANC alliance evoked their worst fears. Both stood for a capitalist
white-ruled southern Africa in contrast to the “chaos” and “disintegra-
tion” in the black ruled “socialist” camp north of the Zambezi. How-
ever awful the oppressive system of apartheid was, any revolutionary
alternative must be worse. Southern Africa, following the collapse of
Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique, became the the-
ater of the Cold War as never before. Southern Africa’s mineral
resources were assets the West claimed as a matter of right. Through-
out the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. and Britain cast more vetoes to ensure
that white minority regimes were protected from international sanc-
tions. For example, between 1980 and 1988, the Western Powers vetoed
twelve separate U.N. Security Council resolutions condemning
apartheid South Africa—the U.S. vetoed all the twelve, Britain eleven,
and France four. Six resolutions concerned South Africa’s illegal occu-
pation of Namibia, and four concerned South Africa’s aggression in
the Front Line States. Because of these vetoes, South Africa enjoyed
protection from the full weight of the international community after its
brutal invasion of Angola when the U.S. vetoed (with Britain abstain-
ing) a resolution in August 1981. In May 1986, both the U.S. and Britain
used their veto after Pretoria attacked Botswana, Zambia, and Zim-
babwe, killing innocent civilians. The following month, Britain and the




In 1986, following the declaration of the second state of emergency
by P.W. Botha, public indignation and pressure in the U.S. and Britain
increased for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. Reagan
and Thatcher tried to establish a moral equivalence between apartheid
and sanctions. For instance, Reagan was forced to criticize apartheid as
morally wrong and politically unacceptable; in the same breath, he
agreed with Mrs. Thatcher that punitive sanctions were also immoral
and repugnant. Pretoria, he said, was not obliged to negotiate with the
terrorists of the ANC, but Mandela should be released, to participate in
the political process. The strongest allies of blacks, Reagan insisted,
were the Western businessmen who brought in their own ideas of
social justice: capitalism is the natural enemy to such feudal institu-
tions as apartheid.78
The Reagan and Thatcher years will be noted above everything else
for the green light they gave to the apartheid regime to destroy the
economies of the Front Line States. South Africa, the United States,
Britain, and the Western Powers in general, never accepted the
regimes that assumed power in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.
Nor did they look favorably at SADCC. In order to negate these three
states, the Pretoria regime adopted a three pronged strategy. First,
South Africa, with the strategic support of the U.S. and Britain, did
everything it could to prevent SWAPO from assuming power in
Namibia. Second, Pretoria wanted to deny the ANC and SWAPO rear
bases in Angola and Mozambique. Third, South Africa wanted to suf-
focate SADCC—the embryonic nine-nation grouping.
When the Reagan Administration assumed power in 1980, a fourth
dimension was added. With the help of UNITA bandits in Angola and
RENAMO in Mozambique, South Africa at the maximum wanted to
replace both MPLA and FRELIMO and at the minimum to have the
two bandit organizations included in the coalition governments. From
1981, the South Africa forces occupied and pillaged the southern part
of Angola while RENAMO wrecked havoc on the economy of Mozam-
bique. The tragic death of President Samora brought a new danger that
threatened to split Mozambique in two.
Destabilization proved a far more successful strategy for South
Africa and its imperialist allies. Under the guise of constructive engage-
ment, the apartheid regime was provided with the freedom from the
threat of sanctions to wreak havoc on Angola and Mozambique, both
through direct military intervention and through massive support of
its surrogates. The continuing turmoil in Angola and the Lake region
Macalester International Vol. 9
68
as well as the devastated economy of Mozambique impose heavy bur-
dens on the democratic government of South Africa.
VII. Mandela’s Release in 1990
If we really want to lose everything, then we must hang on to everything
now.79
On February 2, 1990, President F.W. de Klerk, who, in a power strug-
gle within the National Party, had replaced P.W. Botha, announced
that on February 11, Nelson Mandela would be released from his life
term prison sentence and that the African National Congress, the
South African Communist Party, and other organizations would be
unbanned. He also expressed the hope that a new constitutional settle-
ment, including all the people of South Africa, would be negotiated.
With that announcement, the history of South Africa had turned full
circle. The scene at Groote Schuur (the house that Cecil Rhodes built),
where F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela sat at the same table and
talked about a new constitutional order for the country, was some-
thing no one expected to happen in our lifetime. It was as if the ideol-
ogy and the infrastructure, which had attempted to strangle people’s
minds for nine decades, had collapsed overnight.
The symbolism of the place where the talks took place was as
important as their substance. It was the “first truly serious meeting”
between the white government and the ANC in 78 years, Mandela
observed. The event, he went on, was “freighted with deadly weight of
the terrible tradition of a dialogue between master and servant.” To
overcome that burden, Mandela asked “all who are hostages of the
past to transform ourselves into new men and women who shall be fit-
ting instruments for the creation of a new South Africa.”
These developments had no precedent in history. It was the first
time that a ruling racist regime of any white settler country had begun
what would lead to a fundamental change in the constitutional struc-
ture of the country. This really was Act II of the South Africa Act of
1909, which had led to the creation of the Dominion of the Union of
South Africa in 1910. It was also an admission that South Africa was
not and could not remain a “white man’s country,” but, in the words
of the Freedom Charter of the ANC, it must belong to all who live in it.
From May 1990, the NP and the ANC began the tedious process of
negotiating the modalities for dismantling white minority rule. Diffi-
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cult as the process would be, nobody doubted that the people of South
Africa shared the need to create a new constitutional formula in order
to escape the crippling legacy of colonial conquest and its distorted
psychological legacy.
The very acknowledgment that the ANC could not be ignored was a
major achievement. From 1912, the ANC had been the custodian of the
national aspirations of the African people under the most difficult cir-
cumstances. Even more striking was the unbanning of the Communist
Party of South Africa. One of the first measures taken by the NP after it
came to power was to pass the notorious Suppression of Communism
Act in 1950. The chief reason for the Act had been to defend “white”
South Africa from the twin dangers of black nationalism and “commu-
nism.” Now all that fear seemed to have been jettisoned. On February
11, Nelson Mandela walked out of prison arm in arm with his then-
beloved wife, Winnie.
Mandela’s release itself was a global event, transmitted around the
world by satellite. The celebration that followed, especially Mandela’s
whirlwind visit to the U.S., underlined the scale of the defeat that de
Klerk and the international forces of imperialism had suffered. The
man the regime had sought to condemn to oblivion in 1964 had not
only survived, but had come out a world statesman. The organization,
for whose politics he had been convicted, had emerged as a major
negotiating partner. The ANC, in its revised strategy, acknowledged
the momentous nature of these events:
All these developments represent a major victory for the forces, led by
the ANC, which have struggled for many decades for the destruction of
the system of white minority domination and the transformation of
South Africa into a united, democratic and non-racial democracy. The
immediate issue on the agenda was the question of political power. To
effect the transfer of power into the hands of the people as a whole was
and still is the most crucial and immediate challenge facing the national
democratic movement.80
Even with the start of the negotiations, the ANC could not lose sight
of the fact that the regime still retained the capacity to implement
counterrevolutionary measures on a whole range of fronts. “The white
ruling group,” the 1990 Guidelines on Strategy stated, “has entered the
negotiations process with its own agenda: a radically reformed system
of apartheid which will retain the essentials of white domination, of
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economic, political, and social institutions of our country.” Develop-
ments in South Africa from 1990 to the eve of the elections vindicated
this analysis.
VIII. The Meaning of 1994
Looking back at the period from approximately 1806 to 1994, one is
struck by the monumental efforts white settlers made to reduce
Africans into nothing else but pure labor power. This effort involved
politics of sheer domination unmediated by any human compassion.
Almost 84 years after Britain created the edifice of white minority rule,
under the leadership of the ANC those whom Fanon called “damned
of the earth” woke up from the dead to rejoin the living. As Nadine
Gordimer put it, the election of the African National Congress as the
head of the transitional government in May 1994, was not just a new
beginning.
It was a resurrection; this land rising from the tomb of the entire colonial
past shared out among the Dutch, the French, the British, and their
admixture of other Europeans, this indigenous people rising from the
tomb of segregated housing, squatter camps, slum schools, job restric-
tions, forced removals from one part of the country to another; from bur-
ial of all human aspirations and dignity under the humiliation of
discrimination by race and skin; this people rising, for the first time in
history, with the right to elect a government: to govern themselves. A
sacred moment is represented in the act of putting a mark on a ballot.81
It is certainly tempting to see in the triumph of the ANC and its
allies a watershed dividing the period of colonial dominance in Africa
from that of the abdication in the white redound. The NP, which was
formed in 1914 to represent the national aspirations of the Afrikaners
who had suffered defeat in the Anglo-Boer War, had reached its
apogee in 1948 when it assumed power and began a program to finally
solve the “native problem.” The 1913 Land Act made 87% of South
Africa a “white man’s country” where Africans were allowed only if
they came to sell their labor power. If 1948 marked the apogee of
Afrikaner nationalism, 1960 marked the nadir for African hopes. In
1960, the ANC and the Pan African National Congress had been sum-
marily banned because of their demand to share power in a unified
South African state. Debating the Unlawful Organizations Bill (which
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gave the legal authority to ban the two movements), the Minister of
Justice, when describing the actions of the two Congresses as revolu-
tionary, said, “What they want is our country.”82
In 1966, at the fifth anniversary celebration of the declaration of
South Africa as a republic, Dr. Verwoerd, the erstwhile prime minister,
declared that, “Although we are young, we are a nation in South
Africa to whom all belong, and all of us can say with pride, this is our
country.”83 On another occasion, Verwoerd pronounced that “South
Africa was a piece of Europe at the tip of the African continent.”84 In
other words, the apartheid system was more than an oppressive and
exploitative legal structure with far-reaching social and economic con-
sequences. When we talk about “white South Africa,” we are talking
about a state that did not accept the African as a legitimate part of the
country. Segregation as it evolved into apartheid became the state poli-
cies to mobilize the force and violence necessary to regiment black
labor as an alien and coerced force.
It might be useful at this point to remind ourselves of an event in
January 1947, when the Dominions Office had become the Common-
wealth Relations Office. The Times marked the occasion in a leader
tinged with regret for vanished forms:
The historic word Empire, however it may have been misrepresented
abroad, calls for no apology. . . . It commemorates the centuries in which
the British have striven, first to work out the conception of political lib-
erty for themselves, and then to communicate that liberty to all the peo-
ples who share their allegiance. The goal and achievement are now
summed up in a title that is proof against detractors, the British Com-
monwealth of Nations.85
“What did it then amount to,” asks Grierson, “that concept of which
Lord Roseberry had spoken, over which Smuts had theorised, and into
which the ‘Empire’ was being dissolved?”
Any photograph of a Commonwealth Conference in the immediate
aftermath of the Second World War will supply the answer — a small
group of white men standing protectively around the British monarch
on the Buckingham Palace lawns. ‘The Commonwealth is a closed
group,’ said the Honourable D. F. Malan, Prime Minister of the Union of
South Africa, in the spring of 1951. ‘The Commonwealth can.. .exist only
as a result of an essential identity of interest between all its members.’86
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This is the irony of ironies, that Smuts and Malan, the racists to the
core, could define the nature and principles of the Commonwealth!
South Africa, having been forced to leave the Commonwealth, would,
after the triumph of Mandela, rejoin it again.
A. The Inauguration of the Government of National Unity
“On 10 May 1994, amid an atmosphere that was joyous, moving and
solemn,” writes Judd, “Nelson Mandela was sworn in as the State
President of the Republic of South Africa.”87 The ceremony ended 350
years of white domination in South Africa. Mandela, with his calm and
dignified bearing sometimes dissolving into small and spontaneous
displays of pure pleasure, swore “to be faithful to the Republic of
South Africa, so help me God.” In his inaugural speech, the new State
President announced that “The time for healing of wounds has come.
The moment to bridge the chasms that divide us has come. The time to
build is upon us.” He concluded with this promise: “Never, never and
never again, shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the
oppression of one by another.”88
The end of white domination had enormous international signifi-
cance. The event itself was witnessed by one of the largest gatherings
of world leaders of all political persuasions. President Fidel Castro of
Cuba, the long time nemesis of the United States, received the loudest
and most prolonged ovation. He shared the stage with the United
States First Lady Hillary Clinton and Vice President Al Gore; so did
Libya’s Moammar Gaddafi and Yassar Arafat of the Palestinian Liber-
ation Organization — more bogeymen in American politics. To those
who formulated Nixon and Reagan policies in the 1980s, President
Mandela shared the stage with what had seemed a lost generation of
“freedom fighters,” if they were charitable, or “terrorist,” if they
expressed their true feelings. Included on the stage were Walter Sisulu,
Govan Mbeki, and Joe Slovo.
In the background, there were grim-faced, uniformed pillars of the
soon-to-be-discarded Anglo-Afrikaner white supremacist state who
stood, in the words of Judd, “like undertakers or godfathers” in the
burial of the old order.
In a sense, the inauguration of Nelson Mandela, based on the irrefutable
triumph of the African National Congress in the preceding general elec-
tion, may be seen as one of the last and, arguably, one of the most dra-
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matic and moving transfers of power within a country which had for-
merly been among the most prosperous, controversial, valued and bit-
terly contested within the British Empire and the Commonwealth.89
The “new” South Africa was born amidst profound relief, a palpa-
ble desire for reconciliation, overwhelming optimism, and genuinely
high hopes for the future. Even with all the birth pangs, the GNU has
managed the transition with remarkable success. How will South
Africa escape what President Mbeki, on the occasion of the adoption of
the Republic of South Africa Constitutional Bill, called an “immoral
and amoral past”? It has, first and foremost, to do with the character of
the ANC and the nationalism that it represents. That is, the long estab-
lished traditions of building a “broad church,” or a “hegemonic” orga-
nization that does not seek to define itself in exclusionist, or narrow
ideological terms.90
Also, in 1990, when de Klerk released Mandela and unbanned all
organizations, neither side had defeated the other. “The corollary of
this was that both sides continued to dispose of sufficient strength to
inflict casualties on each other.”
Equally important, each side understood clearly that because the other
had these possibilities, continuation of the conflict meant that whoever
sought to assume a militant posture, summarised in the slogan ‘The
Struggle Continues,’ would have to accept that they too would be
severely bled and weakened, to the point where any victory they
secured might very well result in them as victors having to preside over
a wasteland.91
This, then, was the context of the much-maligned policy of reconcil-
iation. Does reconciliation mean ignoring the injustices of the past and
present? The answer to this question raises even more questions. For
instance, could reconciliation have taken place without democracy?
Peaceful transformation entails compromises, and some of these are
extremely painful to the victims. Mbeki, in an interview in the Cape
Times, underlined the problem:
Within the ANC, the cry was to ‘catch the bastards and hang them.’ But
we realised that you could not simultaneously prepare for a peaceful
transition while saying we want to catch and hang people. So we paid a
price for the transition. If we had not taken this route, I don’t know
where the country would have been today. Had there been a threat of
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Nurenberg-style trials over members of the apartheid security establish-
ment we would never have undergone the peaceful change.92
Are these just excuses of a regime that has lost its way and betrayed
the revolution? That is, has the ANC become an instrument of the
African petty bourgeoisie? In the discussion document, The Character of
the ANC, the question of shifting class alliances is addressed:
While the overwhelming majority of the poor, unemployed and margin-
alised are black, the last few years have seen the rapid development of a
new black, upper middle-class. The gap between the richest ten-percent
of blacks and the majority has grown very rapidly. Many ANC’s leading
cadres have benefited directly from these new realities. The promotion
of tens of thousands of formerly oppressed is a progressive develop-
ment, but it does need us to be thoughtful on this issue. We must ensure
that the ANC continues to represent the interests of the great majority,
and not, narrowly, those of an emerging new elite. What is now needed
is not a “poorer the better” moralising outlook. Rather, we must ensure
that both ideologically (in the values and policies we develop) and
organisationally, the new powers, wealth and privileges do not become
an end in themselves, but are used in the service of the national democ-
ratic struggle. The best means for ensuring this strategic objective is
keeping the movement, mass participatory character of the ANC. This is
the best antidote to the danger of our organisation being transformed
into a narrow, professionalised machine, enjoying support, but not
empowering mass participation.93
IX. Conclusion
This essay put into some historical perspective South Africa’s transi-
tion to democracy. The task is enormous. The travails of nation build-
ing in the modern world are well known. Following the end of white
minority rule in 1994, the GNU began to redefine the character of the
new South Africa. Today a new flag and a new anthem — made up of
the national anthem of the movement and the Afrikaner anthem —
have been accepted. In building a nation, there are many traditions to
be taken into account. There are many wounds to be healed. In a multi-
ethnic country like South Africa there are many sacred traditions and
“illustrious” predecessors to be taken into account. The nation is a
common project for the present and future. The tragedy of white
minority rule was very much in the minds of those who crafted the
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South African Constitution. Given the crimes of the white minority,
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was appointed. The ratio-
nale was simple—a capacity to feel shame for the crimes of the past had to be
part of any healthy national consciousness.
Looking at the achievements of the GNU, it would be difficult to
disagree with Anthony Lewis who recently visited South Africa. He
wrote in The New York Times:
Of all countries, South Africa cannot be separated from its past. Not long
ago it was a country where people were tortured and murdered because
of their politics. A country where, because of their race, husbands were
systematically separated from their wives. A country where a small
minority, defined by race, held all economic and political power. Given
that history, it is something of a miracle that South Africa today is a nor-
mal country with social and economic problems. The problems are large,
but they can be debated in freedom. Tyranny is only a memory.94
Lewis touches on two important issues: that South Africa cannot forget
its past and that though it is now a “normal” country, it has enormous
socioeconomic problems. The black-white economic disparities are a
thing to behold. They are not an act of nature but were humanly cre-
ated. It is important to always remind ourselves that for those who
wished to create capitalist relations of production, the foundation
stone of their endeavor was the restriction of land ownership to the
white minority and the exclusion of the black majority from any share
in property. As I have said, the 1913 Land Act epitomizes the inequity
of this restriction. It is interesting to recall the agrarian changes that
accompanied the Industrial Revolution in England. There we find the
author of the Gloucestershire Survey of 1807 recording without embar-
rassment the forthright opinion that the “greatest evils to agriculture
would be to place the labourers in a state of independence [i. e., by
allowing them to have land] and thus destroy the indispensable grada-
tions of society.” “Farmers like manufacturers,” said another writer of
the time, “require constant labourers—men who have no other means
of support than their daily labour, men whom they can depend on.”95
To say that wealth and poverty are two sides of the same coin in a
capitalist society may have been forgotten in the former metropolitan
countries. But in South Africa the fact that poverty is concentrated
mostly among Africans is a constant reminder that white wealth was
achieved through the instrument of economic pressure. Monopoly,
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usury, and actual expropriation were due to the dispossession of
indigenous owners. The South African white capitalist class is a cre-
ation not of thrift and abstinence, as economists have traditionally
depicted it, but of wholesale and unconscionable dispossession of
Africans by dint of economic and political advantage.
This raises the question of the suitability of affirmative action. Can it
work in a country where inequalities were entrenched by law? Coinci-
dent with legal imposition of discrimination was the growing exclu-
siveness of white trade unions, which barred African employment in
any skilled or semi-skilled work. In the past six years, the ANC gov-
ernment’s initial priority has been to improve employment opportuni-
ties for victims of apartheid, and it has pursued an aggressive policy of
equity in the labor market. Tough new legislation has been passed to
ensure that those who were discriminated against have a fair deal. The
Employment Equity Act, passed in 1999, is the cornerstone of the new
affirmative action policies. Until the labor market is democratized,
South Africa’s newly won freedoms will remain a chimera.
Affirmative action has evaded the central truth about South African
democracy in the first place and in capitalist countries in general.
Today there is a great deal of clap-talk about democracy as a precondi-
tion for economic development. In this talk, the market is seen as the
panacea for all economic ills. Since the collapse of communism in the
Soviet Union, socialism is pronounced dead and capitalist globaliza-
tion is the new mantra. However, isn’t globalization really the ideol-
ogy of a new stage of capitalist hegemony that acts without restraints?
Indeed, current globalization with its challenge to the nation state,
underlines even more that, under capitalism, democracy is always
restricted to the political domain, while economic management is
held hostage to non-democratic, private ownership of the means of
production. Such a democracy is incomplete, even by the standards of
the West itself.
Finally, it is important to remember that capitalism is predicated
upon the egotistical and individualistic nature of human functioning
in a marketplace that crushes and overrides the sense of community
and comradeship. 
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